TIME: Almanac 1995

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<text id=90TT0600> <title> Mar. 05, 1990: Interview:Oleg Gordievsky </title> <history> TIME--The Weekly Newsmagazine--1990 Mar. 05, 1990 Gossip </history> <article> <source>Time Magazine</source> <hdr> INTERVIEW, Page 34 How the KGB Helps Gorbachev </hdr> <body> Oleg Gordievsky was once the KGB's station chief in London--and Britain's most valued double agent. He fled to the West in 1985, just before he was to be executed. He believes the KGB brought Mikhail Gorbachev to power and is busy keeping him there By Frank Melville and Oleg Gordievsky Q. If glasnost had happened sooner, would you still have defected? A. I deliberately and purposefully had started to cooperate with the British in order to help the security of Britain and the West, the U.S. not least, and continued as a British agent for years, and was prepared to continue for many more years, even though I knew my situation was getting increasingly dangerous. Then I was trapped by the KGB by a false excuse and taken to Moscow, where I was drugged and interrogated. So in my case, it was a long collaboration with the British, and then a dramatic escape from the Soviet Union in 1985. Would I still be an agent of the West today? Yes, even now I probably would, because I am still not entirely convinced that democracy and freedom will win in the Soviet Union. The main elements of the totalitarian society in the Soviet Union remain. They are the one-party state, the state-owned economy with one acceptable ideology for the whole society, and the secret police. Q. Can you describe your escape from the Soviet Union? A. Not really, because there may be someone else who might try the same means. I planned it for some time, in case of danger. But even with careful planning it was an extremely difficult and dangerous enterprise. When they took me back to Moscow, I thought it was all over, I would die. They drugged me, interrogated me, but then let me go, I don't know why, though the KGB kept me under surveillance all the time. But I managed to act on my escape plan--despite some difficulties and some encounters on the way to the border with the police and the KGB--and cross the border to the West, which was a fantastic relief. I felt it was a miracle. I crossed the border with my KGB identification card in my pocket. For some reason, the KGB did not dismiss me after my interrogation, so I was still in its employ when I escaped, though I had been removed from my previous position. I think they suspected I was working for the West and hoped to get more evidence against me before they executed me. Q. Are British and U.S. intelligence cleansed of Soviet agents? A. The British and American services were, I believe, clean at the time of my escape. I can't guarantee it, of course, particularly on the American side, because I don't know the American side well. But on the British side, I am pretty sure they remain clean. With the so-called illegals--KGB officers using a foreign identity--it is different. I understand they were all withdrawn from Britain because of me when I escaped. But in the 4 1/2 years since, they may have restored that presence. Q. What prompted you to collaborate with the British? A. Idealism caused me to do it; I wanted to work for freedom for my own country too. I had thought about it for a long time. Before the invasion of Czechoslovakia I said to myself, "I break with this regime." A few years later I started collaborating with the British. Q. Is the KGB a supporter and protector of Mikhail Gorbachev's policies? A. Yes, it is. I think it is very sad that the Soviet leadership has to use a huge secret-police organization to guarantee the program of reforms and some liberalization and some democratization. In the 1970s and '80s, the KGB was practically the only uncorrupted agency in the Soviet Union, a well-disciplined force. As such, it was important to Gorbachev as an instrument of policy. It was the KGB that from at least 1984 saw in Gorbachev the only promising candidate whom it could support and whom it wanted to be the new leader after the series of elderly and ailing leaders. The KGB felt the need for reform. It saw the catastrophic situation in the Soviet Union better than anybody else because it is the best-informed body in the Soviet Union about internal and external developments. From the start, Gorbachev asked the KGB to provide information for the government, an independent, objective view of the economic, social and political situation. The KGB remains an important tool for him. It is the only agency he has not restructured. Q. So the KGB still performs its more negative functions? A. Yes, the KGB still watches those who are politically dangerous to the regime, those who are in the political opposition, those who support nationalist and separatist tendencies, those who are generally against the communist system. Sadly, because the KGB is so important to the regime, to Gorbachev, the negative aspects of the KGB remain intact and ready to start repression again when the situation might demand it. Also, the KGB's massive internal espionage continues unabated. Abroad the KGB has a huge network of intelligence stations that is not really in proportion to the needs of the Soviet Union. The fact that the KGB remains intact, working, recruiting people, collecting information, is, I think, in contradiction to glasnost and perestroika and to the "new thinking" that changed and improved Soviet foreign policy. If the objective is relaxation between East and West, then espionage should be minimized as well, which is not the case with the KGB. It is slowly expanding abroad, with a bit more emphasis on industrial spying. There are more than 100 KGB agents in Washington and another 100 at least in New York City, and huge stations in West Germany, France and India, for example. The KGB still reinforces the prejudices, suspicions and misconceptions of the Soviet leadership, which remains paranoid toward the West. This means the KGB still tells the Soviet leadership and the armed forces that now that the Soviet Union is getting weaker, the West could resort to an attack. Nonsense. Q. What was your greatest coup as a Western spy? A. When I reported to the West that the Brezhnev leadership, in its profound misconceptions, ignorance and prejudices, became acutely fearful of a surprise pre-emptive nuclear strike on learning that the U.S. was developing the Strategic Defense Initiative. The Brezhnev leadership reckoned that if the U.S. was to possess strategic superiority, it would certainly stage a surprise nuclear attack on the Soviet Union. This information helped the West to realize the depth and danger of Moscow's paranoia. Q. Might the KGB find the current disorders in the Soviet Union too much and act to topple the regime and the troublemakers? A. It is absolutely impossible. The KGB was never omnipotent. Even if many of its members are unhappy with the disorder and unhappy that any freedom at all has been granted in the Soviet Union, it is a well-disciplined organization, and it follows orders; it is not adventuristic. Q. How genuine is the Soviet Communist Party's decision to renounce its political exclusivity? A. I am very skeptical and cautious about it. The party wants to give the impression that it is not the undisputed authority, but it still is determined to remain in control of society, to remain the main force. The party remains deeply entrenched, deeply rooted in all [government] agencies. There is no other administration apart from the party. At some time, potential opposition forces will become political parties and will fight for some influence. But that will take at least until the next millennium. Q. Is there a chance that the army, worried about the disturbances in the Soviet Union caused by Gorbachev's reforms, might intervene to topple him? A. I don't think so. The leadership of the army and of the party are close to each other. And the majority of the officers do not wish to get involved. There are very few of them who would want to be in charge of all the mess, to take all the responsibility for cleaning it up without any guarantee that they can do it. In the past the Soviet political situation was predictable; now it is getting less and less predictable. There are some important people in the party who, because of the country's chaos, talk about a possible split in the party. If it comes to that, the army will have to decide whom to pay its allegiance to, whom to support. Then it cannot entirely be ruled out that the army will become politically decisive in which side ends up on top. Q. Will Moscow use force against secession by the Baltic states? A. No. There are several reasons. Moscow will not hesitate to use force in Azerbaijan and similar places. The Caucasus is strategically very important, and the Soviet leadership is less concerned about public reaction there. But the Baltics are so civilized, so connected to the West. All that makes military intervention there more difficult. Q. Do you think the KGB has forgiven you in the new climate between East and West and within the Soviet Union? A. No. Q. Will it ever? A. No. Never. But I would like to think that now that Gorbachev has said he wants the Soviet Union to join the family of civilized nations, he will let my family go free. </body> </article> </text>